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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Third District Court properly award Respondent/Appellee his 
attorneys' fees on the second appeal given the applicable law and the finding that 
Respondent/Appellee clearly prevailed on appeal? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a 
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error 
standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 
1993). 
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2. Does the mandate doctrine apply to circumstances in which 
application of the doctrine is clearly erroneous? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a 
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error 
standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 
1993). 
3. If the Third District Court erred in awarding Respondent/Appellee his 
attorneys' fees, was this error harmless error? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a 
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error 
standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 
1993). 
4. Is Respondent/Appellee entitled to his attorneys' fees in connection 
with this appeal? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review as to an interpretation of a 
Court's decision on appeal is a question of law. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 874 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1994). A correction of error 
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standard applies. Allen v. Utah Department of Health, 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 
1993). 
Issue Preserved in the Trial Court. One of the two issues on remand was 
attorneys' fees. This issue of attorneys' fees on appeal is also raised in this Brief 
of Appellant. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of 
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, 
or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may award costs and attorney fees 
upon determining that the party substantially 
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The 
court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds 
the party is impecunious or enters in the 
record the reason for not awarding fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the third appeal in this case. Appellant (hereinafter "Anderson") 
claims that the Third District Court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the 
Appellee (hereinafter "Thompson") for fees incurred by Thompson in the second 
appeal. Thompson responds that the Third District Court ruled correctly on the 
remand in awarding Thompson his attorneys' fees on the second appeal. 
Alternatively, Thompson submits that the mandate doctrine is not applied 
inflexibly giving the Third District Court the ability to award Thompson his 
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attorneys' fees on appeal. Thompson also submits that even if an error occurred, 
any error was harmless error. Thompson, as the prevailing party on the second 
appeal, was entitled to his attorneys' fees on appeal. Thompson requests that the 
Third District Court award of his attorneys' fees should be affirmed and that the 
case should be remanded to the Third District Court for an award of his attorneys' 
fees on this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Third District Court entered an Order from Hearing Held April 16, 2007 
on June 15, 2007. (R. @ 398-400). This Court reversed the Third District Court 
Order from Hearing held April 16, 2007. 
This Court remanded the case to the Third District Court for a determination 
as to whether a basis existed for an award of $455.08 to Anderson and "to 
determine if an award of costs and attorneys' fees should be awarded the husband 
(Thompson) and, if so, to determine the amount." (R. Pg. 536 and Appellant 
Addendum 3). Opinion reported at 2008 UT App. 170. 
Disposition in Third District Court. The Affidavit of Bruce L. Richards 
setting forth the attorneys' fees related to trial court proceedings based on 
Anderson's Order to Show Cause dated February 22, 2007 and the Appeal from 
the Order from Hearing Held April 16, 2007 (the Second Appeal) was filed 
January 12, 2009 (R. Pgs. 572-589). The Third District Court held an evidentiary 
7 
hearing on February 9, 2009. Following the February 9, 2009 evidentiary hearing, 
the Third District Court entered a Minute Entry on March 20, 2009 (R. Pgs. 723-
727 and Appellee Addendum 1). 
Oral argument was subsequently held on Anderson's objections to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding Fees and Costs on 
Remand on June 17, 2009. The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (R. 816-820 and Appellant Addendum 1) and Order Regarding Fees and 
Costs on Remand (R. 821-822 and Appellant Addendum 2). The basis for 
Thompson's attorneys' fee claim is Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2). The District 
Court ruled Thompson clearly prevailed on the second appeal. (R. @ 829). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent/Appellee Glen Thompson submits that the Third District Court 
correctly awarded him his attorney's fees on the second appeal. This Court's 
instructions on remand are not limited to trial court fees. Thompson met all 
requirements for an award of attorneys' fees on appeal. 
The mandate doctrine does not apply to circumstances in which application 
of the mandate doctrine is erroneous. The mandate doctrine is not applied 
inflexibly. The Third District Court correctly awarded Thompson his attorneys' 
fees on appeal. To do otherwise would be erroneous and would work a manifest 
injustice. 
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If the Third District Court erred in awarding Thompson his attorneys' fees 
on appeal, any error was harmless. If a specific remand instruction should have 
been given, the ultimate result is the same. Thompson was entitled to his 
attorneys' fees on appeal. 
Thompson is also entitled to his attorneys' fees on this appeal. This appeal 
should be remanded to the Third District Court for this award of fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE COURT 
OF APPEALS REMAND BY 
CONSIDERING ATTORNEYS' FEES 
BOTH AT THE TRIAL COURT AND 
APPELLATE COURT LEVEL. 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to determine if an award of costs 
and attorneys' fees should be made to Thompson and, if so, to determine the 
amount. The determination of whether an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
should be made involved making a finding as to whether Thompson was the 
prevailing party. The Third District Court found Thompson clearly prevailed on 
appeal in the Minute Entry entered March 20, 2009 (R. @ 725 and Appellee 
Addendum 1). This finding is also made in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law entered September 24, 2009 (R. Par. 17 @ 818). 
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The instructions on remand are not limited to trial court fees. The 
instructions are to determine if an award of attorneys' fees should be made and to 
determine the amount. Thompson met all of the requirements for an award of 
attorneys' fees on appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides a statutory basis for the award of 
attorneys' fees. This statute as relied on by this Court in remanding the case states: 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2), provides that, 
"in any action to enforce an order of 
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, 
or division of property in a domestic case, 
the Court may award costs and attorneys 
fees upon determining that the parties 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or 
defense." Accordingly, we remand to the 
District Court to determine if an award of 
costs and attorneys fees should be awarded 
the husband and, if so, to determine the 
amount. 
2008 Ut. App. 170 @ 10. 
The standard for awarding attorneys' fees on appeal is whether a party is 
entitled to attorneys' fees in the trial court. In Oliekan v. Oliekan, 147 P.3d 464, 
471, 562 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Ut. App. 2006), this Court stated the law applicable 
to attorneys' fees on appeal as follows: 
.. .In divorce actions, we will generally 
award attorneys fees on appeal to the 
prevailing party if the trial court awarded 
attorneys fees and the receiving party 
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prevails on the main issues on appeal... 
(Citations omitted.) 
In Oliekan, the Court determined that the wife had not prevailed on appeal 
and was not entitled to attorneys' fees. However, in this appeal, the case was 
remanded to the District Court to determine if under the standards of Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3(2) Respondent was entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees. 
The standard to be applied was whether the Respondent substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The Third District Court (in Finding of Fact 17 and 
Conclusions of Law 4 that are not subject to Anderson's appeal) found that 
Thompson clearly prevailed on the appeal and was entitled to attorneys' fees. (R. 
@ 817-818 and Appellant's Addendum 1). These attorneys' fees include those on 
appeal. 
Attorneys' fees on appeal were requested by Thompson. Thompson in the 
second appeal requests attorneys' fees in the Appellant's Brief (Appellee's 
Addendum 2) and in the Reply Brief (Appellee's Addendum 3). Issue 4 in the 
Statement of Issues is "Did the District Court err in not awarding Respondent his 
attorneys' fees?" (Appellee's Addendum 2 Pg. 6). Point VII of the Appellant's 
Brief in the second appeal not only addresses denial of Anderson's fees, it also 
request Thompson's attorneys' fees. As to fees on appeal, the Appellant's Brief 
states, "Respondent is also entitled to his attorneys' fees and costs of appeal." 
(Appellee's Addendum 2 Pgs. 26-28). 
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In Point V of the Appellant's Reply Brief in the second appeal, the basis for 
attorneys' fees is analyzed. In the Conclusion, Thompson states: "This case should 
be remanded for an award of the Appellant's attorneys' fees including fees on 
appeal." (Appellee's Addendum 3 Pg. 11). 
Thompson met all the requirements to recover his attorneys' fees on appeal. 
The remand instructions should be read to require a determination of the amount 
for attorneys' fees for Thompson at both the trial court and appellate court levels. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ON REMAND 
HAD AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS THE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AT 
THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE 
COURT LEVEL. 
As set forth in Point I, Thompson was entitled to attorneys' fees at the trial 
court and appellate court levels as the prevailing party in the trial court and as the 
prevailing party in the second appeal. Anderson relies upon Cache County v. 
Beus, 128 P.3d 63, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 72 (Ut. App. 2005) as support that 
attorneys' fees can be awarded only when specifically remanded. Anderson's 
reliance upon Beus is in error based upon the facts and circumstances of the Beus 
case as well as the holding. Beus was before the Court of Appeals on two 
occasions. 
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In the first appeal reported at 978 P.2d 1043, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Ut. 
App. 1998), the Court concluded that Beus (not Cache County) substantially 
prevailed on appeal. Beus was awarded his reasonable attorneys' fees incurred on 
appeal. Following the remand in the first appeal and in contradiction to the award 
of fees to Beus, the trial court awarded Cache County all of its attorneys' fees 
including fees on appeal. This Court reversed this award of fees to Cache County 
on two bases. First, the contract pursuant to which attorneys' fees were 
recoverable provided that costs and fees were recoverable for successful 
vindication of contractual rights. The trial court's award of attorneys' fees and 
costs to Cache County from the inception of the case failed to consider only fees 
and costs attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights. Second, 
the Court reversed the trial court as to attorneys' fees on the first appeal because 
the first appeal decision had not awarded Cache County fees but had awarded Beus 
attorneys' fees. The Court did not allow the trial court to make an inconsistent 
determination of fees. 
Anderson incorrectly analyzes Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 926, 929 
(Ut. App. 1995). Anderson asserts that this case stands for the proposition that the 
trial court cannot consider attorneys' fees on appeal except as specifically 
authorized to do so. However, in the first Slattery appeal, the trial court had ruled 
that each party would bear its own attorneys' fees. Slattery made its first request 
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for attorneys' fees at the Court of Appeals based on an employment contract. The 
Court refused to address the claim for attorneys' fees. The Court stated: 
Slattery also seeks attorneys' fees on appeal, 
based on the employment contract. 
However, she was not awarded attorneys' 
fees at the trial and did not appeal from that 
determination. Because Slattery does not 
present any argument to support her request 
for fees on appeal, we decline to address the 
issue. 
857 P.2d 243 at 249. 
The Slattery decision found the trial court exceeded its authority on remand 
because the Court of Appeals awarded no attorneys' fees. The finding of the trial 
court that each party would bear their own costs and attorneys' fees was not 
appealed. A separate effort to claim attorneys' fees on appeal even though not 
allowed at the trial court level was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. The 
trial court's subsequent award of attorneys' fees was inconsistent with the original 
trial court decision that had not been appealed, the Court of Appeals' refusal to 
allow attorneys' fees on appeal when first raised at the Court of Appeals level and 
the Court of Appeals remand. 
Other cases cited by Anderson also are different from the current situation 
and are not controlling. Anderson cites a footnote from TS 1 Partnership v. Allred, 
877 P.2d 156, 239 Ut. Adv. Rep. 51 (Ut. App. 1991) for the proposition that it is 
not within the province of a trial court to award attorneys' fees on appeal from that 
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court. An award of attorneys' fees on appeal is the prerogative of the appellate 
court. TS 1 Partnership involved an improper certification of a final order pursuant 
to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court found both 
parties should pay their own costs related to the improper certification and appeal 
of the original summary judgment that was not a final order. The Court footnoted 
that an award of attorneys' fees on appeal is the prerogative of the appellate court. 
The basis for not awarding attorneys' fees related to the nature of the proceeding 
and the outcome, not to entitlement to attorneys' fees on appeal. 
In Yorke Management v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 546 N.E.2d 342, 344 (1989), 
the Massachusetts Court addressed a Massachusetts procedure different from that 
applicable in Utah respecting the determination of attorneys' fees on appeal. The 
Massachusetts Court acknowledged that a basis for attorneys' fees existed under 
Massachusetts law. The Court stated: "the right to appellate attorneys' fees under 
the statutes is beyond dispute." The language of the Yorke Management case 
about authorization from an appellate court to a trial judge related to the procedure 
wherein the Massachusetts appellate court addressed the amount and 
appropriateness of attorneys' fee claims rather than remanding this determination 
to the trial court. The Massachusetts Court did not change its existing procedure 
retaining for the appellate court the responsibility for determination of the 
attorneys' fees on appeal 
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In Vinton Eppson Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, 638 P.2d 1070 
(New Mexico 1981), the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed a request to 
remand the case for an assessment of appellate attorney fees and decided against 
remanding for that purpose. Consequently, on the subsequent appeal, the Supreme 
Court ruled the District Court had exceeded the mandate of the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico by awarding appellate attorneys' fees. 
In Schere v. Z.F. Inc., 578 So.2d 729 (Fl. 3d DCA 1991), the Court 
addressed two separate requests for attorneys' fees on appeal. One of two 
plaintiffs proceeded to obtain a final judgment of foreclosure. This judgment was 
affirmed on appeal with a motion for attorneys' fees being denied. See Tobin v. 
Compte, 553 So.2d 1180 (Fl. 3d DCA 1989). The plaintiff subsequently filed a 
motion for attorneys' fees in the trial court. The trial court granted the motion but 
denied the request for attorneys' fees incurred at trial and fees for defending a 
judgment on appeal and costs. These additional motions that included the request 
for attorneys' fees on appeal were denied. The Florida appellate court reversed the 
denial of the motion for trial fees and costs. 
The second creditor filed a foreclosure action. The holder of a third 
mortgage was a defendant who moved to dismiss the action. A motion to dismiss 
was denied. The defendant creditor appealed with the appeal being affirmed. See 
Tobin v. Schere, 546 So.2d 796 (Fl. 3d DCA 1989). The appeals court denied a 
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motion for attorneys' fees. The case was then voluntarily dismissed with prejudice 
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sought costs and attorneys' fees for services 
before the trial court and for defending the appeal. The trial court denied the 
motion for fees and the appeal was taken. Because the plaintiff had voluntarily 
dismissed, the appellate court ruled the voluntary dismissal terminated the trial 
court's jurisdiction thereby removing jurisdiction from the court for further 
proceedings. 
The prior Florida cases cited in Schere for the proposition that a specific 
remand for appellate attorneys' fees is required are likewise different than this 
appeal. In Homsby v. Newman, 444 So.2d 90 (FL 3d DCA 1984), the trial court 
made an award of attorneys' fees in connection with a custody action on a claim 
for allowance of temporary attorneys' fees. The court reversed the award of 
temporary attorneys' fees because it impermissibly compensated Appellee's 
counsel for services rendered during prior appeals. The Court stated: 
Absent a remand from an Appellate Court, a 
trial court lacks authority to award appellate 
attorneys' fees. Furthermore, there is 
another, perhaps even more glaring 
deficiency in the record. An 
Appellee/mother failed to establish her need 
for, and the father's ability to pay a 
reasonable attorneys' fee... (Citations 
omitted.) 
444So.2d90at91. 
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In Ellswick v.Martinez, 394 So.2d 529 (Fl. 3d DCA 1981), the Court 
addressed an appeal of orders awarding child support, expert witness fees, travel 
expenses and costs incident to a birth in a contested paternity case. The award of 
attorneys' fees was affirmed with the exception of the portions expressly attributed 
to legal services on the prior appeal. The prior appeal, Ellswick v. Martinez, 341 
So.2d 1095 (Fl. 3d DCA 1976), involved a one-word opinion "affirmed." 
The Florida cases involve unique Florida procedures. Rule 9.400 Florida 
Rules Appellate Procedure provides a motion for attorneys' fees to be served not 
later than the time for service of the Reply Brief and shall state the grounds upon 
which relief is sought. The assessment of attorneys' fees may be remanded to the 
lower tribunal. If attorneys' fees are assessed by the court, the lower tribunal may 
enforce payment. 
In three of the cases cited by Anderson, the trial court acted on attorneys' 
fees on appeal after the issue had been specifically rejected. (Beus, Slattery and TS 
1 Partnership). In Vinton Eppson there was no remand to the trial court. In Yorke 
Management and Schere, Massachusetts and Florida had unique procedures for 
appellate attorneys' fees not applicable to this case. In this appeal, the cases cited 
by Anderson do not support her position that the trial court acted in opposition to 
the mandate of this Court. Rather, in this case, Thompson meets the requirements 
for recovery of attorneys' fees on appeal. 
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POINT III 
THE MANDATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT 
APPLY TO CIRCUMSTANCES IN 
WHICH APPLICATION OF THE RULE IS 
ERRONEOUS. 
The mandate doctrine is a law of the case doctrine providing that matters 
adjudicated by an appellate court are final and not subject to further trial court 
action. The mandate doctrine did not preclude the Third District Court from 
awarding Thompson his attorneys' fees on appeal. 
As set forth in this Brief, the trial court acted within the scope of the remand 
in addressing appellate attorneys' fees for Thompson. There was a remand for 
attorneys' fees without limitation as to the trial court or appellate court levels. 
Assuming arguendo that the Court did not make a remand to the Third District 
Court specific enough to allow consideration of appellate attorneys' fees, 
exceptions to the mandate rule apply to allow a trial court to consider the 
attorneys' fees on appeal. In Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Ut. 60, 
191 P.2d 153 (Ut. 1948), the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether on remand 
the District Court could consider amended pleadings and different issues than 
existed prior to the remand. The Court stated: 
The principles boil down to this fundamental 
proposition: As to all matters adjudicated by 
the appellate court, both the trial court and 
the parties are foreclosed from further trying 
those matters. They become the law of the 
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case. But as to matters left open by the 
appellate court, it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to permit 
amended or supplemental proceedings as to 
those matters. 
191 P.2d 153 @ 158. 
This Court instructed the Third District Court to "determine if an award of 
costs and attorneys' fees should be awarded the husband and, if so, to determine 
the amount." (R. @ 536). This Court did not deny attorneys' fees to Thompson. 
Consequently, the remand to the District Court for consideration of attorneys' fees 
involves at least a matter left open by this Court. 
In Gilden v. Guardian Title, 31 P.3d 543, 438 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21 (Ut. 2001), 
the Court addressed the implications of the mandate doctrine. The Court noted that 
the mandate doctrine is not applied inflexibly. The Court stated: 
... Indeed, this court need not apply the 
doctrine to promote efficiency at the 
expense of the greater interest in preventing 
unjust results or unwise precedent. 
Accordingly, the doctrine will generally not 
be enforced under the following exceptional 
circumstances: 
(1) When there has been an intervening 
change of controlling authority; 
(2) When new evidence has become 
available; or 
(3) When the court is convinced that its prior 
decision is clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice. 
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In this case, assuming that the Appeals Court did not remand for a 
determination of Thompson's appellate attorneys' fees, the third exception to the 
mandate rule applies. Thompson met all of the requirements to be awarded 
appellate fees. To deny Thompson the appellate fees would be clearly erroneous 
and would work a manifest injustice. The manifest injustice being that Thompson 
would be denied the fees he is entitled to because no specific reference to appellate 
fees was made in the remand of this Court. The award of attorneys' fees at the trial 
court and appellate court level for Anderson in the first appeal while denying 
appellate fees to Thompson on a similar basis points out the injustice of 
Anderson's position. 
In Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 (Ut. 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the rationale of the law of the case doctrine. The doctrine protects the 
decisions already made in a case. Specifically, the Court stated: 
... The law of the case doctrine generally 
provides that a decision on an issue at one 
stage of a case is binding in successive 
stages of the same litigation. However, this 
doctrine does not prevent a judge from 
reconsidering his or her previous non-final 
orders. As Justice Holmes once noted, the 
law of the case doctrine "merely expresses 
the practice of courts generally to refuse to 
reopen what has been decided, not a limit to 
their power.".. (Citations omitted). 
809 P.2d 734 @ 739-740. 
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The issue of Thompson's appellate attorneys' fees was not decided by the 
District Court or the Court of Appeals prior to the appeal. There was no prior 
decision that was being revisited by the trial court in opposition to the decision of 
this Court. The District Court properly acted within its power. The Third District 
Court's award of attorneys' fees is consistent with the Court of Appeals remand 
and applicable law. 
POINT IV 
IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
AWARDING THOMPSON'S 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
WITHOUT A SPECIFIC REMAND, THIS 
ERROR WAS A HARMLESS ERROR. 
The law applicable to appellate attorneys' fees is not in dispute. Thompson 
is entitled to fees on appeal if Thompson was entitled to fees at the trial court level. 
The trial court found Thompson to be entitled to these fees. Anderson does not 
argue that Thompson did not prevail at the trial court or on appeal. Rather, 
Anderson argues that this Court's failure to specifically identify appeal fees and 
costs leads to a result that those fees and costs are not recoverable. 
At the oral argument held June 17, 2009, Anderson's counsel argued the 
following regarding the basis for denying Thompson his attorneys' fees: 
".. .Husband argues that with a reversal he 
should be awarded his attorney fees and 
costs below," and we're not going to dispute 
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that. But it doesn't say anything about his 
attorney fees for appeal two. 
And they're saying in the affidavit 
Mr. Richards providing in February, had a 
total of the pre-appeal fees of $3,900 -
$3,902.50 and then had his appeal two fees 
in addition which I don't think, well, don't 
think - the court didn't say that they would 
be entitled to that. 
Now, I understand the argument, 
what's good for the goose is good for the 
gander. Get it. Because in appeal one the 
Court of Appeals did outline that and so I 
understand it. If the Court looks and it says, 
Well, since the Court of Appeals said the 
lower court could look at an award of 
attorney fees for the appeal, why can't we 
do it here in appeal two? And I'll be the 
first to admit that it's an interesting 
argument, but they did not specifically set 
that forth. 
(R. @ 417 Pgs. 6-7, Appellee Addendum 4.) 
Anderson argues for a result acknowledged to occur only by a hyper-critical 
reading of this Court's remand and a result inconsistent with applicable law. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Glew v. Ohio Savings Bank, 598 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
47, 2008 Utah 17 (Ut. 2008), considered a petition for rehearing for an award of 
fees on appeal. The petition followed a successful defense of an appeal reported in 
Glew v. Ohio Savings Bank, 288 P.3d 791, 582 Ut. Adv. Rep. 27 (2007). The 
Supreme Court while noting that a motion brought under Rule 23, Utah Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure would be the basis for applying for an award of attorneys' 
fees on appeal, stated: 
The availability of fees on appeal is, 
however, an issue that is in almost all 
instances, ancillary to the issues to which the 
parties have devoted their energies and 
precious brief pages. This issue is never an 
issue on appeal that can be expected to 
appear in a docketing statement under the 
requirements of Rule 9(c)(7) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure... 
The Supreme Court reiterated the "settled view" that a party who received 
an award of attorneys' fees below is entitled to their fees on appeal granting the 
application for attorneys' fees. In Glew, the Supreme Court did not address 
attorneys' fees in its holding. The error was corrected by entering an order 
allowing fees. In this case, Respondent's right to attorneys' fees and costs was 
remanded to the Third District Court. 
In Glew, the Court utilized the motion as a means to correct the error. In 
this case, either no error occurred and the case was remanded for a determination 
of all attorneys' fees both at the trial and appellate levels or this Court erred by not 
setting forth a specific remand for appellate fees. This error can be corrected by 
this Court by affirming the District Court's award of attorneys' fees. 
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POINT V 
APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO HIS 
ATTORNEYS'FEES ON APPEAL. 
Thompson's basis for recovery of attorneys' fees is statutory. Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides for attorneys' fees in this action. Thompson submits that 
the Third District Court's Order should be affirmed. An affirmance makes 
Thompson the prevailing party in this appeal. Consequently, this case should be 
remanded to the Third District Court for a determination of an award of attorneys' 
fees to Thompson on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the Third District Court awarding Thompson attorneys' fees on 
appeal should be affirmed. This case should be remanded to the Third District 
Court for an award of attorneys' fees incurred on appeal to Thompson. 
DATED this 2 ^ _ day of May, 2010. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
Bruce L. Richards 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Third District Court 
Minute Entry 
Entered March 20, 2009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^^T^H^^ 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA LAREE ANDERSON, fka 
LINDA LAREE THOMPSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, 
Respondent. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 994300102 
The Court of Appeals remanded this matter for consideration of 
attorney's fees claims twice: on petitioner's claim for fees after the 
decision on appeal, January 4, 2008, m favor of the petitioner; and 
after the decision on appeal, May 15, 2008, in favor of the respondent. 
An evidentiary hearing was held February 9, 2009, to consider both 
of these matters. Petitioner was present and represented by David J. 
Friel, and respondent was present and represented by Bruce L. Richards. 
The parties testified, the Court received exhibits, and now makes this 
ruling. 
On the first remand, this Court was directed to consider the 
standard criteria for award of fees: (1) requesting party in need of 
assistance; (2) fees reasonableness; and (3) responding party's ability 
to pay. The respondent stipulated that he has the ability to pay. 
The evidence showed petitioner has gross monthly income of $728, 
plus $2,061 in monthly child support, plus an annual child support 
r\ n n P ( w 
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payment earmarked for Christmas and birthday gifts in the amount of 
$2,200. Her income has been static for the past eight years. She works 
approximately 25 hours per week in a daycare facility. She previously 
cut and colored women's hair in a salon in her home, but does that only 
once or twice a year at the present time. She has remarried as of 2004, 
has an additional child, and her spouse earns $13.50 per hour working 
full-time. Petitioner testified that she can't afford her attorney's 
fees and needs help. The total family income at the present time is 
approximately $3,138 per month gross. Petitioner's family has a marital 
home, two vehicles which are paid for, and claims total monthly living 
expenses of $4,982, with expenses exceeding income in a relatively small 
amount. Attorney fees were not included in said monthly expenses. 
Petitioner's counsel's Affidavit indicates that he bills his time 
at $200 per hour and bills his office staff at $40 per hour, and that on 
the first appeal billed petitioner $9,605.20. The Court finds that 
petitioner's hourly rate is toward the top end of hourly rates for 
domestic work in Tooele County, but is not unreasonable, but finds that 
billing out office staff time at $40 per hour is neither reasonable nor 
ethical. Mr. Friel stated that his staff is not paid the $40 per hour 
unless the client pays, so his staff has exactly the same interest in the 
firm's accounts receivable as he does. A review of the time spent on the 
appeal does not indicate that increments of time expended on specific 
aspects of the appeal were unreasonable. 
A r\ n n n 
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Respondent objects to both the hourly rate and the time expended on 
the basis that counsel for respondent bills at $175 per hour and spent^ 
less time on the appeal than did counsel for petitioner. The Court finds 
that the time and hourly rates of Mr. Friel are reasonable and that the 
petitioner should be awarded fees in that amount, specifically not 
including any amounts billed for staff from Mr. Friel7s office. 
The first appeal was simply regarding the ruling after trial. The 
second appeal was different. Respondent appealed the Court's Order 
holding him in contempt. The Appeals Court reversed and remanded, 
specifically stating: 
Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-3(2), provides that, "In any action to 
enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court 
may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the 
party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense." 
Accordingly, we remand to the District Court to determine if 
an award of costs and attorney fees should be awarded the 
husband and, if so, to determine the amount. 
Respondent clearly prevailed on appeal. Since the Appeals Court 
relied on the enforcement provision of the statute, it does not appear 
that this Court needs to use the same analysis as used on the first 
remand, that of need and ability to pay, but should of course consider 
reasonableness. A review of Mr. Richards' Affidavit regarding the 
attorney fees and costs expended on appeal shows that both the hourly 
rate and the time increments for the tasks performed were necessary and 
THOMPSON V THOMPSON PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
reasonable, and therefore respondent is awarded attorney's fees m the 
amount set forth m said Affidavit. 
Mr Richards shall prepare Findings, Conclusions and a Judgment 
consistent with this Minute Entry 
Dated this (H day of March, 2 009 /f^ hTA'iw%iL 
/ y \ o i 
STEPHEN L HENRIdD ^ ^ / f^j? 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.*/ 
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TflATLlTSG CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this ^ day of March, 2009: 
David J. Friel 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2875 S. Decker Lake Drive #225 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Bruce L. Richards, Esq. 
Dean A. Stuart, EscJ. 
18 05 S. Redwood Road 
P.O. Box 25786 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125-0786 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Thompson's Brief of Appellant 
In Appellate Case 20070514 
Statement of Issues 
And 
Point VII 
And 
Conclusion 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA ANDERSON, ) 
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson), ) 
Petitioner, ] 
v. ] 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, ; 
Respondent. ] 
) Appellate Case No. 20070514 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH 
JUDGE MARK S. KOURIS 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
David J. Friel Bruce L. Richards 
Attorney for Petitioner Dean A. Stuart 
f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson Bruce L. Richards and Associates 
2875 South Decker Lake Dr. #225 Attorneys for Respondent 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 1805 South Redwood Road 
Telephone: (801) 975-8611 P.O. Box 25786 
Salt Lake City, UT 84125-0786 
Telephone (801) 972-0307 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
ISSUE 4: Did the district Court err in not awarding Respondent his attorney's 
fees? 
ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the award of attorneys' fees for 
the Respondent was raised at the evidentiary hearing. Specific objection to the attorneys' 
fee award took place at the end of the evidentiary hearing. (R@416 P. 78-79). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The interpretation of a divorce decree is reviewed 
for correctness, affording the District Court no deference. Hawkins v. Peart, 2000 Utah 
94, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-32-1 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are 
contempts of the authority of the Court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while 
holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial 
proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to 
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an 
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a judicial 
or ministerial service. 
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non-compliance with reducing the child support amount. Respondent made his January 
2007 of 2,500 plus.. ." (R@396-297). 
Inexplicably the Court made Finding of Fact Number 7 that states: 
Regarding the issue of refunding $455.08 from 
Petitioner to Respondent concerning the 
difference in the January child support payment 
is ruled in favor of Petitioner. Therefore, 
Petitioner has no need to refund those monies. 
(R@395 % 7.) 
An extended discussion involving the Court and Petitioner's counsel took place during 
the evidentiary hearing regarding the adjustment to the child support. The Court reviewed 
Exhibit 7, a letter from Petitioner's counsel to Respondent's counsel. The letter stated that an 
adjustment to the child support could be made based on information provided by the Respondent. 
Should a different conclusion result based upon subsequently prepared tax returns, a separate 
adjustment would be required. The Court concluded Respondent had paid the correct amount. 
(R@146 Pgs. 41-43). 
There is no factual basis for ruling in favor of Petitioner regarding the difference in child 
support. Respondent overpaid the child support and should recover this excess. 
POINT VII 
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
OF CONTEMPT OR ON ANY STATUTORY 
BASIS. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-2 provides for a discretionary award of attorney's fees in 
an action to enforce a divorce action. Specifically, this statute states: 
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In any action to enforce an order of 
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the 
court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially 
prevailed upon the claim or defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) (Supp. 2005). 
The Decree of Divorce has a provision related to attorney fees. This provision 
provides that attorney's fees are awarded if the Court finds a party in contempt of court. 
Specifically, Paragraph 34 of the Decree of Divorce states: 
If any party should be found to be in 
contempt of any provisions of any Order of this 
Court, that party shall be responsible for paying 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the 
enforcement thereof. (Appendix C, R@46). 
Here, Petitioner brought this Order to Show Cause primarily to recover more child 
support. This conclusion is bolstered by the claims of the Petitioner in the Order to Show 
Cause that Respondent had failed to pay the proper amount, Petitioner's Affidavit that 
she wanted the Court to Order more child support to be paid, the lack of any prior effort 
by the Petitioner to arrange different payment methods for payment of child support and 
the lack of any damages by the asserted misconduct of Respondent. The Respondent 
successfully defended against these allegations and consequently should recover 
attorney's fees. 
As set forth throughout this Brief, Respondent should not be held in contempt of 
Court. The basis for the award of fees does not exist. 
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Assuming arguendo that Respondent was in contempt of Court, Petitioner is not 
entitled to an award of all her attorney's fees. The fees must be allocated to the issues on 
which Petitioner prevailed. 
Respondent is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Even 
if Petitioner were found to have prevailed on some issues, Respondent is entitled to 
recover his fees for the issues Respondent prevailed on. This includes the child support 
issue. Respondent is also entitled to this attorney's fees and costs of appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests that this Court reverse Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Order 
from Hearing Held April 16, 2007. Respondent should recover the excess $455.08 in 
child support paid in January 2007. Respondent should recover his attorney's fees and 
costs. For purposes of determining Respondent's attorney's fees and costs, the case 
should be remanded to the District Court. 
Dated this j/j> % day of November, 2007. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
ML 
Bruce L. Richards 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Thompson's Reply Brief of Appellant 
Point V 
And 
Conclusion 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA ANDERSON, ; 
(f.k.a Linda LaRee Thompson), ] 
Petitioner, ] 
v. 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) Appellate Case No 20070176 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH 
JUDGE MARK S. KOURIS 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
-David-Jr-Friel- Bruce-L. -Richards-
Attorney for Petitioner Dean A. Stuart 
f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson Bruce L. Richards and Associates 
2875 South Decker Lake Dr. #225 Attorneys for Respondent 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 1805 South Redwood Road 
Telephone: (801) 975-8611 P.O. Box 25786 
Salt Lake City, UT 84125-0786 
Telephone (801) 972-0307 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
ambiguity as to what Paragraph 3 means. The District Court, however, did not rule, as a matter 
of law, that Paragraph 3 was ambiguous. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT, IN THE FIRST APPEAL OF THIS 
MATTER, ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES. FEES MUST 
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE 
ANK §30-3-3. FINDINGS MEETING THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE MUST BE 
MADE. 
In Anderson v. Thompson, 594 U. Adv. Rep. 3, the Court addressed attorney's fees in 
circumstances where the Court found Appellant owed additional child support and other amounts 
and was in contempt of court. This Court ruled that the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 
must be met in order for attorney's fees to be awarded and that the District Court had not made 
the necessary findings. This Court stated: 
Under Utah Code section 30-3-3, a trial court "may 
order a party to pay the costs, attorney's fees, and 
witness fees . of the other party to enable the other 
party to prosecute or defend the action." "In doing 
so, however, the trial court must base its award of 
attorney' s-fees- '-on evidence-of-the-receiving 
spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability 
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees" further, ccthe decision to award attorney's 
fees" must be based on sufficient findings regarding 
these factors." (Citations omitted.) 
Anderson v. Thompson, 594 U. Adv. Rep. 3, @ par. 40 (Ut Ct. App 2008). 
The District Court in this proceeding did not apply Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. The 
District Court did not make the findings required by Anderson v. Thompson. The District court 
further refused to award fees to Appellant or reduce Appellee's fees based on the Appellant 
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prevailing on the significant issue in this proceeding. This issue was Appellee's claim that 
Appellant owed more child support in January, February and March, 2007. 
The District Court's refusal to award fees to Appellant or reduce Appellee's fees is 
specifically addressed by Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. The requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
3(2) apply to this proceeding. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides: 
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-
time, child support, alimony, or division of property 
in a domestic case, the court may award costs and 
attorney's fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. 
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against the party if the court finds the 
party is impecunious or enters in the record the 
reasons for not awarding fees. 
In this case, the trial court did not apply this statute. The Court did not consider that the 
Appellant was the prevailing party on the claim that the Appellant had not paid the correct child 
support for January, February and March, 2007. The Appellant, the prevailing party, should 
have been able awarded his costs attorney's fees with respect to the issue of child support. This 
fee award would apply unless the District Court found the Appellee impecunious or entered 
reasons for not awarding fees. 
POINT VI 
THE REQUIRED FACTS FOR DECIDING THIS 
APPEAL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED. 
Appellee argues that how the appeal should be dismissed because the facts were not 
marshaled. (Brief of Appellee Argument: Point Two.) Appellee argues that a Finding of Fact is 
. being challenged and all record evidence supporting the finding has not been marshaled. See 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(9). 
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The issues in this appeal involve errors of law by the District Court and the Findings of 
the District Court that do not meet the requirements of law. The issues in this appeal are matters 
of law. The issues of law are the constitutional requirement that a party be afforded due process 
in a contempt proceeding; the statutory requirement that an Order of the Court be violated; the 
making of Findings of Fact meeting the three requirements for contempt; finding that the 
required Findings were found by clear and convincing evidence; and complying with Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3 regarding attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the District Court decision. There is no violation of an 
Order of Court meeting the constitutional, statutory and judicial requirements for a finding of 
contempt. There has been no finding by clear and convincing evidence of any violation of a 
legally sufficient Court Order. Attorney's fees should have been awarded to the Appellant. This 
case should be remanded for an award of the Appellant's attorney's fees including fees on 
appeal. 
Dated this 25th day of February, 2008. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
Bruce L. Richards " / 
Attorney for Respondent 
- r v ^ ^ ^ ^ H a ^ 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Transcript of Oral Argument 
June 17, 2009 
Pages 6 and 7 
1 February hearing and in your minute entry ruling, found not 
2 only that we should be awarded the reasonable attorney fees 
3 because of the needs-based analysis that Your Honor did, but 
4 Your Honor then specifically awarded our attorney fees for 
5 the appeal. 
6 And the difference was the Court of Appeals gave 
7 this Court direction to do that. So in appeal one it said, 
8 we remand, or under appeal one was only remanded for attorney 
9 fees. Everything else stood on the contempts and all others. 
10 And then it said with the Judge Kouris ruling, since he 
11 didn't do the needs-based and reasonableness, it was 
12 remanded. So then the Court of Appeals gave this Court 
13 direction and said, if the court finds that there was need 
14 and does that analysis, then it can enter the attorney fees 
15 and specifically the court said, and the court can then 
16 address the attorney fees for appeal number one. And so 
17 they're not disputing that. 
18 And the only reason I bring it up is in appeal 
19 number two and that page number 5 specifically then, Your 
20 Honor, I'm looking at Line 3 again, backing up just a little 
21 bit, it's says, "likewise, there is no basis to grant wife's 
22 request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
23 Husband argues that with a reversal he should be awarded his 
24 attorney fees and costs below," and we're not going to 
25 dispute that. But it doesn't say anything abo'ut his attorney 
1 fees for appeal two. 
2 And they're saying in the affidavit Mr. Richards 
3 providing in February, had a total of the pre-appeal fees of 
4 $3,900 - $3,902.50 and then had his appeal two fees in 
5 addition which I don't think, well, don't think - the court 
6 didn't say that they would be entitled to that. 
7 I Now, I understand the argument, what's good for the 
goose is good for the gander. Get it. Because in appeal one 
9 I the Court of Appeals did outline that and so I understand it. 
10 If the Court looks and it says, Well, since the Court of 
11 Appeals said the lower court could look at an award of 
12 attorney fees for the appeal, why can't we do it here in 
13 appeal two? And I'll be the first to admit that it's an 
14 interesting argument, but they did not specifically set that 
15 forth. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Friel. 
17 MR. FRIEL: Thank you. 
18 MR. RICHARDS: Mr. Richards appearing on behalf of 
19 J the respondent. 
Your Honor, as I've calculated through and as I 20 
21 indicated we, we by and large had no particular issues or 
22 
24 
problems. It appears that the Court has approved a total of 
23 $51,964.58 in favor of the petitioner. That includes the 
amounts that were ordered by the Court plus the attorneys 
25 fees of $7,652.97, 
7 
